PRIVATE PLANE-HENDRICK MOTORSPORTS

NTSB Identification: IAD05MA006
14 CFR Part 91: General Aviation
Accident occurred Sunday, October 24, 2004 in Stuart, VA
Aircraft: Beech 200, registration: N501RH
Injuries: 10 Fatal.

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

On October 24, 2004, at 1235 eastern daylight time, a Beech 200 King Air, N501RH, operated by Hendrick Motorsports Incorporated, was destroyed when it collided with rising terrain during a missed approach to the Martinsville/Blue Ridge Airport (MTV), Martinsville, Virginia. The certificated airline transport pilot, certificated commercial copilot, and eight passengers were fatally injured. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed for the corporate/executive flight that originated from the Concord Regional Airport (JQF), Concord, North Carolina, at 1156. An instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91.

The purpose of the flight was to fly employees of the Hendrick Motorsports Team and their family members to an automobile race in Martinsville, Virginia.

A preliminary examination of radar and voice communications from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that during the en route portion of the flight, a radar target identified as the accident airplane maintained all assigned altitudes and headings.

As the airplane approached the Blue Ridge Airport, an air traffic controller advised the flight crew that they were second in line for the Localizer Runway 30 approach and instructed them to hold "as published" on the localizer course at 4,000 feet, and to expect a 28-minute delay in the holding pattern. The flight crew requested 5-mile legs in the holding pattern and the controller approved 5 or 10-mile legs at the crew's discretion.

The Localizer Runway 30 approach at the Martinsville/Blue Ridge Airport had an inbound course of 305 degrees. The minimum descent altitude for the intermediate section of the approach and the holding pattern southeast of the BALES locator outer marker was 2,600 feet. The minimum descent altitude on the final segment of the approach, with distance measuring equipment (DME), was 1,340 feet, and the missed approach point (MAP) was at 1 DME. The distance from BALES to the MAP was 5 DME.

The accident airplane approached the outer marker from the south, crossed the outer marker at 4,000 feet, and turned towards the outbound leg of the holding pattern. At 1224:19, while the airplane was in the entry turn, the controller asked if the airplane was established in holding, and the flight crew confirmed, "we're established." At 1224:26, the controller cleared the airplane for the Localizer 30 approach and requested that the crew advise when they were inbound on the approach. The airplane then completed a continuous right-hand turn toward BALES, and crossed abeam BALES at 3,900 feet.

At 1226:53, the flight crew advised that they were "established inbound" on the approach. At that time, the airplane was in the final segment of the approach, on the localizer course. During the final segment, the airplane showed a gradual descent and leveled at 2,600 feet, in the vicinity of the missed approach point. About 1 mile past the missed approach point, over the runway, the airplane began a descent, and continued on an approximate heading of 305 degrees.

The published missed approach procedure was, "Climbing right turn to 2600 [feet] BALES LOM and hold."

The airplane continued on the 305 heading and continued the descent beyond the airport. At 1230:16, at 1,800 feet and 3 miles beyond the airport, the altitude readout went into "coast" and the altitude readout was lost.

At 1233:08, the flight crew called the controller. The controller responded and the flight crew stated, "We're going missed at this time." The controller asked the crew to repeat the radio call. The call was acknowledged, and at 1233:21, the controller advised the crew to "climb and maintain four thousand four hundred" feet. There were no further radio transmissions from the accident crew.

Witnesses at the airport said they heard the airplane pass overhead, but did not see it due to the cloud cover. The engine sound was smooth and continuous with no interruption. One witness said that the engines sounded as though they were at "idle." Two witnesses noted that there was no increase in engine sound at the time they perceived the airplane to be at the missed approach point.

A couple in their church parking lot about 3 to 4 miles southeast of Bull Mountain saw a plane fly past at low altitude. One said the plane flew "flat and level," about 60 to 70 feet above the ground, heading northwest. Other than flying very low, the airplane did not appear to be in distress, and the landing gear appeared to be up. The speed of the airplane "wasn't extremely fast." He also noticed that the "fog level" was low, but couldn't tell how much lower the airplane was from the fog.

A Senior Trooper with the Virginia State Police stated that at the time of the accident, and throughout the search and recovery efforts through the day and evening hours, Bull Mountain was completely obscured by clouds and fog. The visibility was "zero," but at times it would improve to about one-quarter mile.

The wreckage was examined at the site on October 25, 2004, and all major components were accounted for at the scene. The airplane came to rest on the southeast face of Bull Mountain, about 2,450 feet above sea level. The initial impact point was in trees, and the treetops were cut off at an angle parallel to the horizon. The distance from the first tree strikes to the initial ground scar was about 105 feet. The tree strikes and the ground scar were at the same approximate altitude of 2,400 feet. The distance from the initial ground scar to the main wreckage was about 95 feet. Several pieces of angular-cut wood were found along the debris path beneath the trees.

The main wreckage came to rest upright. The cockpit was destroyed by impact, and the cockpit and cabin areas were consumed by post-crash fire. The empennage and tail sections were still attached to the fuselage, but were twisted and came to rest inverted. The vertical fin and rudder were damaged by impact and fire. The left horizontal stabilizer was largely intact with the elevator attached. The right horizontal stabilizer was impact damaged, with the inboard half still attached. Pieces associated with the outboard section were scattered along the wreckage path.

Both wings were still attached to the fuselage at points just outside of the engine nacelle on each wing. The outboard sections and their associated parts were also scattered along the wreckage path. Both inboard sections were essentially intact, but damaged by impact and post crash fire. Both left and right flaps were retracted, and both main landing gear were retracted and in their respective wells.

The left engine was in its nacelle and still attached to the wing by cables and wires. The engine was damaged by impact and fire. The exhaust stacks were damaged by impact and displayed malleable bending. The left propeller assembly was separated from the engine and came to rest beneath the fuselage and entangled with the wreckage. The blades showed similar twisting, gouging and chordwise scratching. One blade was bent over at mid span almost 180 degrees. One blade was fractured and the outboard one-third was separated. Another blade tip was wrinkled and torn. The propeller shaft was fractured and displayed fracture surfaces consistent with impact and overload.

The right engine was separated from its wing, and came to rest uphill from the main wreckage. The engine was damaged by impact and fire, and the exhaust stacks displayed malleable bending. The propeller shaft was fractured and displayed fracture surfaces consistent with impact and overload. The right propeller assembly was located adjacent to the initial impact crater, in an upright position, with all four propeller blades attached. Three of the four blades displayed similar twisting, bending, leading edge gouging, and chordwise scratching. The tips of two blades were fractured. One blade was twisted and bent aft, with chordwise scratching.

Control cable continuity was established from the cockpit to the flight control surfaces, except for the ailerons. Aileron cable continuity was established from the cockpit to the point of left and right wing separation outside of the engine nacelles. The breaks in the aileron cables were "broomstrawed".

The pilot held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane multi-engine land. He held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single engine land. The pilot's most recent first class medical certificate was issued December 15, 2003.

A preliminary review of company training records revealed the pilot had a total of 10,600 hours of flight experience. He reported 8,600 hours of experience in the Beech 1900. His total experience in the Beech 200 King Air could not be determined.

The pilot's most recent flight review was May 27, 2004, in the Beech 1900.

The copilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. Her most recent first class medical certificate was issued April 1, 2004.

A preliminary review of company training records revealed the copilot had approximately 2,100 hours of flight experience. She reported 1,200 hours of flight experience in single engine airplanes, and over 860 hours in multi-engine airplanes. In July 2004, she reported 250 hours of flight experience in the Beech 200 King Air. Her employer reported that she had 140 hours of flight experience in the Beech 200 King Air in the 90 days prior to the accident.

The copilot's most recent flight review was May 27, 2004, in the Beech 1900.

The airplane was a 1981 Beech 200 King Air, and it had accrued 8,140 hours of total time. The airplane was on a Manufacturer's Inspection Program, and its most recent phase inspection was completed June 25, 2004, at 8708.8 aircraft hours.

The airplane was equipped with a global positioning system (GPS) receiver, but it was not certified for IFR flight. The airplane was not equipped with a cockpit voice recorder, a flight data recorder, or a ground proximity warning system.

After the accident, FAA and State of Virginia personnel inspected all of the navigational equipment at the Martinsville/Blue Ridge Airport. The inspection revealed the equipment functioned satisfactorily.

An FAA flight check of the navigational facilities at the Martinsville/Blue Ridge airport was "Satisfactory."

At 1220, the weather reported at the Martinsville/Blue Ridge Airport included overcast ceiling at 600 feet with 5 miles visibility and calm winds. The temperature was 57 degrees Fahrenheit and the dewpoint was 55 degrees Fahrenheit. The altimeter was 29.98 inches of mercury.

At 1200, the weather reported included overcast ceiling at 600 feet with 5 miles visibility and the wind was from 220 degrees at 3 knots. The temperature was 57 degrees Fahrenheit and the dewpoint was 55 degrees Fahrenheit. The altimeter was 29.98 inches of mercury.

At 1140, the weather reported included overcast ceiling at 400 feet with 1 and 1/4 miles of visibility. The wind was from 200 degrees at 3 knots. The temperature was 55 degrees Fahrenheit and the dewpoint was 55 degrees Fahrenheit. The altimeter was 29.99 inches of mercury.
 

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